Why Does the World Exist: An Existentia - By Jim Holt Page 0,3

notion of reality. Goodness, Beauty, mathematical entities, logical laws: these are not quite something, the way mind-stuff and matter-stuff are. Yet they are not exactly nothing either. Might they somehow play a role in explaining why there is something rather than nothing?

Admittedly, abstract ideas can’t figure in our usual causal explanations. It would be nonsense to say, for example, that Goodness “caused” the Big Bang. But not all explanations have to take this cause-and-effect form; think, for instance, of explaining the point of a chess move. To explain something is, fundamentally, to make it intelligible or understandable. When an explanation is successful, we “feel the key turn in the lock,” in the happy phrase of the American philosopher C. S. Peirce. There are many different kinds of explanations, and each one involves a different sense of “cause.” Aristotle, for instance, identified four different kinds of cause that might be cited to explain physical occurrences, only one of which (the “efficient” cause) corresponds to our own narrow scientific notion. The most extravagant species of cause in the Aristotelian scheme is the “final” cause—the end or purpose for which something is produced.

Final causes often figure in very bad explanations. (Why does it rain in the spring? So the crops will grow!) Such “teleological” explanations were parodied by Voltaire in Candide, and they have been justly rejected by modern science as a way of accounting for natural phenomena. When it comes to accounting for existence as a whole, though, should they be automatically ruled out of court? The assumption that explanations must always involve “things” has been called by one prominent contemporary philosopher, Nicholas Rescher, “a prejudice as deep-rooted as any in Western philosophy.” Obviously, to explain a given fact—such as the fact that there is a world at all—one has to cite other facts. But it doesn’t follow that the existence of a given thing can be explained only by invoking other things. Maybe a reason for the world’s existence should be sought elsewhere, in the realm of such “un-things” as mathematical entities, objective values, logical laws, or Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Maybe something along the lines of a teleological explanation might furnish at least a hint as to how the mystery of the world’s existence could be resolved.

In the very first philosophy course I took as an undergraduate at the University of Virginia, the professor—a distinguished quondam Oxonian with the evocative name of A. D. Woozley—had us read David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. In these dialogues, a trio of fictitious characters—Cleanthes, Demea, and Philo—debate various arguments for the existence of God. Demea, the most religiously orthodox of the three, defends the “cosmological argument,” which says, in essence, that the world’s existence can be explained only by positing a necessarily existent deity as its cause. In response, the skeptical Philo—who comes closest to being a stand-in for Hume himself—comes up with a seductive bit of reasoning. Although the world seems to be in need of a God-like cause of its existence, Philo observes, that might be due to our own intellectual blindness. Consider, Philo says, the following arithmetical curiosity. If you take any multiple of 9 (like 18, 27, 36, etc.) and add up the digits (1 + 8, 2 + 7, 3 + 6, etc.), you always get 9 back again. To the mathematically naive, this might appear a matter of chance. To the skillful algebraist, by contrast, it is immediately seen to be a matter of necessity. “Is it not probable,” Philo then asks, “that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish a key which solves the difficulty?”

I found this idea of a hidden cosmic algebra—an algebra of being!—irresistible. The very phrase seemed to expand the range of possible explanations for the world’s existence. Perhaps the choice was not God versus Brute Fact after all. Perhaps there was a nontheistic explanation for the world’s existence—one discoverable by human reason. Although such an explanation wouldn’t need to posit a deity, it wouldn’t necessarily rule one out either. Indeed, it might even imply the existence of some kind of supernatural intelligence, and in doing so furnish an answer to the precocious child’s dread question: “But mommy, who made God?”

How close are we to discovering such an algebra of being? The novelist Martin Amis was once asked by Bill Moyers in a television interview how he thought the universe might have popped into existence. “I’d say we’re at least five Einsteins away